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Abstract
I study the interplay between language competition and ideology struggle in a country where there is a native
high-status language and a low-status language spoken by immigrants. Language transition is governed by
a three-state model similar to the Minett-Wang (2008) and the Heinsalu et al. (2014) models. I introduce
the novelty that, among natives, an ideological struggle exists between a group of nationalists and a group
of pro-immigrants, thus a two-state model as in Abrams-Strogatz (2003). When bilingualism emerges as an
equilibrium, there might be a completely segregated society with monolingual immigrants and monolingual
nationalistic natives, thus an undesired outcome contrasting with the widespread literature. Removing
ideology struggle, bilingualism is never stable, thus results in Heinsalu et al. (2014) are solely due to the
way conversion rate constants are defined in their model. If language status is explicitly defined in the
model, bilingualism becomes doomed in the long run.
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1. Introduction
The issues of opinion formation, population dynamics, ideology struggle, language competition and the
dynamics of language death have attracted the interest of many physicists, particularly those applying
the tools of statistical mechanics and complex systems. Despite the existence of a connection between
those issues, studies dealing with their combined effects on society are still relatively rare. In this paper,
I investigate the interplay between language competition and ideology struggle by formulating a Lotka-
Volterra-type model in order to study the evolution of language and ideology in a country where there is a
native high status language and a low status language spoken by immigrants coming from the same origin
country. Both languages compete against each other for speakers as in [1–5] and I introduce the novelty that,
among natives, there is an ideological struggle between two groups of individuals, a group of nationalists
and a group whose members welcome immigrants and might have an interest in their culture and language.
Such kind of ideology struggle was studied in [6] in a different framework using evolutionary game theory.
The relevance and motivation to integrate the evolution of ideology and language into the same model can
be seen in [7] who states that language and religion have been the two most important cultural infrastructures
serving as bases for national differentiation and modern demands of autonomy in Europe. In the USA, a
recent example of the interplay among nationalism, immigration and language took place in Dade County,
Greater Miami, from the 1960s until the early 1990s and is described in the work of [8]. After the Cuban
Revolution, Cuban migration to the USA, which main destination was South Florida, took place initially in
three waves, Jan/1959-Oct/1962, Sep/1965-Apr/1966 (freedom flights) and Apr-Oct/1980 (Mariel boatlift),
respectively. The first two waves included skilled workers and high officials of the deposed government,
which together with the Cold War, was an incentive for American natives to welcome those immigrants.
As a result, in 1973, Dade County even declared itself officially bicultural. However, the third wave was
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composed of a large amount of working class immigrants, many of them black, triggering nationalism, anti-
Cuban demonstrations and African American riots in South Florida. Those events culminated with voters
repealing the bicultural status and Dade County declaring that it was unlawful the use of public funds to
promote any language other than English or any culture other than that of the USA.
The model developed here might be of interest in countries with a significant foreign population such as
the case of Luxembourg, whose foreign population jumped from 26.3% (1981) to 38.1% (2003) of the total
population. Portuguese nationals accounted for 13.7% of the total population in Luxembourg in 2003 [9].
In such a context, depending on the interaction between foreign individuals and natives (citizens), together
with public policy regarding language status and assimilation, nationalism might find a fertile environment
to develop and spread. The recent wave of mass immigration of refugees from Syria and other countries to
Europe shows that a study of these issues is of utmost importance.
The contributions of this paper are twofold: (i) when nationalism is introduced in the model, results
are in line with the literature in the sense that eventually one language might disappear with the entire
population becoming monolingual either in the high or low status language. On the other hand, results
also show that when bilingualism emerges, it might be related to a completely segregated society with
monolingual immigrants and monolingual nationalistic natives. Hence, bilingualism might not be a desired
outcome as widespread outlined in the literature so far; (ii) if ideology transition is removed, the model
becomes a particular case of [4] with the extension of [5] with regard to the contribution of bilinguals to
the transition probabilities. I show that under this framework, bilingualism is never stable, thus results in
[5] are solely due to the way the four conversion rate constants kZX , kXZ , kZY , kY Z (see next Section) are
defined in their model, i.e., without any relation among them. When the constants are related to each other
through language status, bilingualism becomes doomed and disappears in the long run.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I review some key papers in the
literature on ideology struggle and language competition, discussing their main results and limitations.
Section 3 presents the model and results discussing the interface between nationalism and language. Section
4 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Models dealing with language competition attracted the interest of physicists particularly after the work
of [1]. The latter provides a minimal model for language shift, where two languages compete with each
other for speakers. Individuals belong to one of two monolingual groups and the population has no spatial
structure, i.e., individuals interact with others at the same rate, thus having each an equal probability
in terms of language influence. Languages are assumed as fixed entities, i.e., grammar, syntax and other
structural properties of language do not evolve over time. The probability of an individual shifting from one
language to the other is proportional to the attracting language perceived status and its number of speakers,
such that no one shifts to a language with no speakers or no status. Language status increases with the
higher social and economic opportunities a typical speaker of a language can obtain. Apart from the strong
assumption that no individual is bilingual, one drawback of the model is that both languages cannot coexist
in equilibrium, which contrasts with the existence of bilingual societies in practice.
The absence of language coexistence was soon overcome in the literature. Although [2] also ignore
the existence of bilingual speakers, they provide an alternative population dynamics setup to that of [1],
belonging to the family of Lotka-Volterra models, in which the rate of change of the number of monolingual
speakers of each competing language depends not only on a term related to the competition for speakers
but also on an additional term taking into account the intrinsic growth rates of each population and their
different carrying capacities in the absence of competition. Thus, when speakers from different languages
do not interact, each language evolves according to uncoupled Verhulst equations towards their carrying
capacities in the long run. Even assuming that only one language is attractive, when both languages
compete for speakers, as long as a threshold condition is satisfied, the only stable equilibrium is one in
which both languages coexist. The threshold condition requires: (i) a small and easily reachable carrying
capacity of the population speaking the attractive language. The latter is achievable by increasing the
opportunities afforded to the speakers of the low status language, (ii) a high growth rate of the speakers of
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the low status language and (iii) a low rate of language shift through minimizing contact between speakers
of the two different languages.
While language death seems to be a quite important issue and the model of [1] displays a good fit with
historical data for endangered languages such as Scottish Gaelic, Quechua and Welsh, which appear to
be on track for extinction in the future, their model is unable to explain cases of successful bilingualism
such as that of Spain with the survival of Catalan, Galician and Vasco, together with Castilian, even after
the Francoist period during which only the latter was officially allowed. Apart from the attempt of [2]
to explain such a puzzle, [3] also studied the issue of language coexistence and went one step further by
introducing a group of bilingual speakers. Their work was particularly motivated by the language context
in the region of Galicia (Northwest of Spain) where there exists a bilingual majority alongside Galician and
Castilian monolingual minorities. Differently from [1] where the endangered languages are very different
from the high status language, Galician and Castilian are very similar and [3] extend the model of [1] by
incorporating a parameter to account for the similarity between both competing languages. Taking into
account two populations of monolinguals and one of bilingual speakers, therefore modelling the evolution
of the three groups over time through a system of two coupled differential equations, their model reduces
to the model in [1] if bilinguals do not exist and both languages are completely different. As in [1], the
language transition probabilities are proportional to the attracting language status and its share of speakers
in the total population, with bilinguals also contributing to the share. Transitions are possible between
any group, i.e., X → Y ; X → Z; Y → X ; Y → Z; Z → X ; Z → Y , where X , Y and Z represent
respectively each of the two monolingual and the bilingual groups. Their main finding is that, given the
status of both competing languages, if a minimum threshold for language similarity is satisfied, bilingualism
becomes a stable equilibrium in which the bilingual group survives in the long run together with the group
of monolingual individuals speaking the high-status language, thus the low-status language survives among
the speakers of the former group.
Hence, the model of [3] was successful in modelling both monolingual and bilingual speakers plus the
survival of bilingualism while it could still reproduce the results in [1]. On the other hand, two important
criticisms were discussed in [4]. Firstly, when no monolingual speaker of one of the competing languages
remains, there would be no advantage conferred to bilinguals and the latter should disappear in the long
run. Also, regarding the possibility of direct language shift between X and Y -speakers and vice-versa,
such transitions would be very unlike in the real world as those would involve the simultaneous loss of one
language and the acquisition of the competing one, i.e., children would acquire a different language from
the one of their parents, in some cases making communication between them impossible. Or monolingual
adults learning a new language would simultaneously forget their native language. In order to overcome
those pertinent limitations, [4] extend the model in [1] accounting for a bilingual group as in [3] and they
introduce a distinction between horizontal and vertical transmission of language. Their mechanism of lan-
guage transmission is more restrictive than that of [3] given they do not allow for direct transitions between
monolingual groups. In terms of vertical transmission, they assume children of monolingual parents neces-
sarily acquire the language of their parents as their first language while children of bilingual parents may
acquire either or both of the competing languages, thus the following group transitions are allowed: X → X ;
Y → Y ; Z → X ; Z → Y and Z → Z. Regarding horizontal transmission, they assume bilingual adults
remain bilingual throughout their lifetimes while monolingual adults may either remain monolingual or learn
a second language. Thus, transitions Z → Z; X → Z; Y → Z; X → X and Y → Y are allowed. Based
on these assumptions, a three-state model similar to that in [3] is built, where the rate of change of the
proportion of each of the three groups in the total population follows the vertical and horizontal language
transmission mechanisms with probability µ (mortality rate, when adults are replaced by children) and
1 − µ, respectively. Thus, transition from monolingualism to bilingualism necessarily takes place through
horizontal transmission and transition in the opposite direction is made through vertical transmission. The
system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) modelling the evolution of monolinguals and bilinguals is
then given by:
x˙ = µcZXsXzx
a − (1 − µ)cXZsY xy
a
y˙ = µcZY sY zy
a − (1 − µ)cY ZsXyx
a
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where x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , z ∈ Z, si is the status of language i, s−i = 1− si (as in [1]), x+ y+ z = 1, z˙ = −x˙− y˙,
cij is the conversion rate from group i to group j which can be associated with the level of educational
resources available in a particular language or the rate of interaction between pairs of individuals belonging
to groups i and j and a is a parameter accounting for how the attractiveness of language i scales with the
share of its speakers. [1] estimated a to cluster about 1.31 while in [4] and [5] the value is assumed to be
1, i.e., the attractiveness of a language increases linearly in the proportion of its speakers. One difference
between [4] and [3] is that in the former the transition probabilities are influenced only by the number of
monolingual speakers of the language being acquired, thus bilinguals play no role on such probabilities. This
follows an interpretation where, in addition to being able to communicate with both i monolinguals and
bilinguals, the i monolingual adult who subsequently acquires language j can additionally communicate with
j monolinguals, therefore only the proportion of monolingual speakers of j matters. The system of ODEs
has two stable equilibria, both associated with monolingualism and there are two critical unstable points,
one related to pure bilingualism and another in which individuals from all three groups survive and co-exist.
Thus, the base model of [4] shares the same prediction as in [1], i.e., one of the two competing languages will
eventually become extinct. On the other hand, an additional stable fixed point can be created in the interior
of the phase space by adopting a mechanism of intervention in which, when the proportion of speakers of the
endangered language falls below a given threshold, the status of the endangered language is increased and
the c-coefficients are adjusted such that the conversion rates from bilingualism to both monolingual groups
are increased and the conversion rates regarding transitions in the other direction are decreased (i.e., the
likelihood that all three groups survive increases by making the two languages become more isolated with
incentives for monolingual education of children).
As can be seen, both models in [1] and [4] require some sort of policy intervention for bilingual sus-
tainability. A successful attempt to model language competition in which both the vertical and horizontal
mechanisms of language transmission are respected and bilingualism can be sustainable without any form
of intervention is proposed in [5]. They also present a three-state model but with distinct transition proba-
bilities between groups than those of [4]. With such novel dynamics, bilingualism is asymptotically stable.
They modify the model in [4] as follows:
x˙ = kZXzx− kXZx(y + αz) (1)
y˙ = kZY zy − kY Zy(x+ βz) (2)
where the parameters ki combine effects such as mortality rate and language status. α, β ∈ [0, 1] represent
respectively the importance of bilinguals as representatives of languages Y and X to the monolinguals of X
and Y . This is particularly important when the two competing languages have significant different statuses
because in such a case the bilingual community would consist mainly of bilinguals coming from the low status
language group and individuals from the high status language might not have an interest in learning the low
status one (e.g.: if the Y -language has a very low status, α would be very low given that Z would be mainly
composed of Y -speakers who learned the high status X-language, thus bilingualism would be associated
with the high importance of the X-language). In this framework, bilinguals play a role in the language
transition probabilities as in [3] but in a more reasonable way. Note that parameter a in the above system is
set to 1, giving a Lotka-Volterra-type model. The dynamics leads bilingualism to be asymptotically stable
whenever α and β are high enough such that they are simultaneously above critical values, i.e., the first
necessary condition for stable bilingualism requires bilinguals to be sufficiently regarded by monolinguals of
one language as members of the monolingual community of the competing language. The former condition
for bilingualism can only be fulfilled if transitions from bilinguals to monolinguals are more rare than the
opposite transitions, thus in contrast with [4]. Also, while in [5] bilingualism survives through bilinguals
taking over the entire population, in [4] when bilingualism survives, all three groups coexist.
From the discussion so far, it can be seen that the seminal model of [1] has been subsequently refined
in the literature over time, with the incorporation of more realistic assumptions in an attempt to prove
that bilingualism can be sustained in the long run, i.e., a low-status language is not necessarily doomed.
Although some of the papers cited above were successful in this task, their policy recommendations display
some clashing directions. Moreover, in the present work, I show that this sort of obsession with bilingualism
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might not be a positive issue in some contexts, particularly when there is an interplay between the issues of
ideology struggle and language competition on society.
Language competition and ideology struggle can be connected not only on the sociological level but also
in terms of modelling given that Lotka-Volterra-type models can be also found in the literature predicting
the evolution of competing ideologies over time. In [10] a model for ideological competition in a country
with growing population is formulated. The evolution of the aggregate population follows the Verhulst law
and individuals are divided in n groups, each with a different specific ideology, plus one ideology-free group.
The number of individuals belonging to each of these n ideological groups evolves according to the following
Lotka-Volterra equation:
N˙i = riNi +
n∑
j=0
fijNj +
n∑
j=0
bijNiNj; i = 1, · · · , n
where the first term accounts for the death of followers of ideology i, i.e., ri < 0. The second term accounts for
the so-called unitary conversion from ideology j to ideology i, i.e., conversion motivated by the information
environment such as newspapers and election speeches. fij reflects the intensity of conversion and the latter
is also proportional to the number of followers of ideology j, thus there is no direct contact between followers
of different ideologies. The remaining term takes into account binary conversion, which is the one due to
direct interaction between members of two ideologies, thus proportional to NiNj , with intensity bij .
Thus, a model unifying the impact of both ideology and language on society is presented in the next
section. The background of language and ideology competition is based on [6]. The latter uses a different
type of model based on evolutionary game theory to study how nationalism and assimilation evolve among
natives and immigrants, respectively, assuming that the latter group comes from the same origin country. In
the host country, the population of natives is divided in two groups, one which members welcome immigrants
and another which members display nationalistic behaviour and try to restrict the access of immigrants to
public services. On the side of immigrants, there are also two groups: one which members display an interest
to learn the native language of the host country, thus making an attempt to become culturally assimilated
while the other group does not learn. When immigrants do not live in an enclave, thus being dispersed
across the host country, depending on the parameters of the model, a dynamics of Lotka-Volterra type is
obtained, with nationalism and immigrant assimilation oscillating over time. In contrast, in the present
work, using a different framework, an asymptotically stable equilibrium is found.
3. Model
I consider a four-state model where the population living in a country can be divided into four groups
denoted X , Y , Z and W , with three types of speakers: a proportion y ∈ Y of monolingual individuals
who only speak the immigrants’ low-status language, a proportion z ∈ Z of bilingual individuals who speak
both the immigrants’ and the natives’ language and the remainder of individuals are monolinguals who only
speak the natives’ high-status language, the latter being split into two groups, with a proportion x ∈ X of
individuals who support immigration and a proportion w ∈ W which members have a nationalistic ideology
and are against immigrants, where x + y + z + w = 1. Figure 1 presents the four groups as well as the
transition rates and possible transitions between groups.
Note that by default, the model assumes that nationalism only exists among native individuals belonging
to W , thus, individuals in X , Y and Z do not discriminate. Some interesting demographic dynamics can
be contemplated in the model such as the typical three-generations pattern of complete assimilation of
immigrants into the native culture found in the US and discussed in [11] and [12]: a monolingual immigrant
arriving in the country makes an effort to learn the native language (transition Y → Z), gives birth to a child
who learns both the native and the foreign language, thus still preserving the parent culture (Z → Z), while
that second generation individual gives birth to a child who only acquires the native language (Z → X). As
an adult, the latter might become nationalist (X →W ) or not.
With probability τ (mortality rate), adults are replaced by children and both language and ideology
follow the vertical model of language transmission discussed in [4] and [5], i.e., a child of a monolingual
5
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Figure 1: General scheme for ideology and language transition rates (color online).
individual necessarily acquires her parent’s language as her mother tongue, while a child of a bilingual
individual might either acquire only one or both languages. Regarding ideology, I also assume that the first
values and social norms acquired by a child are those of her parent, thus a child of an individual belonging
to group W , initially grows up with nationalistic values while children of individuals belonging to the other
groups do not discriminate anyone. Possible transitions regarding the vertical transmission mechanism are
thus X → X , Y → Y , Z → Z, W → W , Z → X , Z → Y . As in [4] and [5], there is no direct transition
between groups X and Y because this would involve a child being unable to communicate with her parent.
On the other hand, with probability 1 − τ , the model follows the horizontal mechanism of language
transmission in [4] and [5], i.e., a bilingual adult remains bilingual over his entire life while a monolingual
adult might remain monolingual or learn a second language. With regard to ideology, I assume that over life
native individuals might remain nationalist or change their ideology and welcome immigrants (transitions
W → W and W → X). The same is valid regarding individuals in group X (transitions X → X and
X → W ). This is in line with ideology struggle in [10] and [6]. Thus, possible transitions following the
horizontal transmission model are X → X , Y → Y , Z → Z, W → W , X → Z, X → W , W → X and
Y → Z. The model assumes no direct transition between W and Z because only in the rarest case a
nationalist would be interested in learning the culture and language of an immigrant. Following the most
natural path, a nationalist would first change his ideology, such as in [10], start welcoming immigrants and
their culture and only then learn the language (W → X → Z).
As can be seen in Figure 1, transition probabilities from the bilingual group Z to a monolingual group are
proportional to a constant cZi; i = {X,Y }, to the mortality rate τ , to the status of the attracting language
si ∈ [0, 1] ; i = {X,Y } and to the size of the attracting group. As usually assumed in the literature, the
relation between the status of the competing languages satisfies sj = 1 − si; i, j = {X,Y }; j 6= i. On the
other hand, transition probabilities in the opposite direction are proportional to a constant ciZ ; i = {X,Y },
to 1− τ , to the status of the attracting language and to the size of the attracting group, in this case i+ψz,
where in the latter either (i = y ∧ ψ = α) or (i = x ∧ ψ = β). Similar to [5], α and β are the importance
of bilinguals as representatives of the foreign and native languages to monolinguals in groups X and Y ,
respectively. Constant parameters cZi and ciZ reflect sociolinguistic factors [5] such as the propensity of
individuals to learn a new language based on their existing linguistic skills or the provision of language
resources for children [4]. Hence, language transition is governed by a three-state model as in [4] with the
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extension introduced in [5] such that bilinguals might influence the transition probabilities.
Regarding the interplay between the two ideologies, the model is similar to [1], i.e., transitions occur
between two-states, the nationalistic ideology and the pro-immigration one. Transition probabilities are
proportional to a constant ci; i = {WX,XW}, to 1 − τ , to the status of each ideology (either s
′
X or
sW = 1 − s
′
X) and to the size of the attracting ideological group. Constants cXW and cWX play the same
role as the constants in the model of [10], i.e., larger values reflect more intense ideology conversion.
Based on the above, the evolution of the share of each group in the total population is given by the
following system of non-linear ordinary differential equations:
x˙ = τcZXsXx
az − (1− τ)
[
cXZ(1− sX)(y + αz)
ax+ cXW (1− s
′
X)w
ax− cWXs
′
Xx
aw
]
(3)
y˙ = τcZY (1− sX)y
az − (1− τ)cY ZsX(x+ βz)
ay (4)
w˙ = (1− τ)
[
cXW (1 − s
′
X)w
ax− cWXs
′
Xx
aw
]
(5)
with z˙ = −x˙ − y˙ − w˙. In this paper, in line with [4] and [5], I set a = 1, i.e., the attractiveness of
a language (ideology) increases linearly with its proportion of speakers (followers). In [5], language sta-
tus, mortality rate and the parameters reflecting sociolinguistic factors are all represented by one sin-
gle constant. Here, I preserve language and ideology status separately and I define a new parameter
ξi = 1; i = {ZX,XZ,XW,WX,ZY, Y Z} describing the interplay between mortality rate and sociolin-
guistic or sociocultural factors. This is equivalent to focus on the particular case in which vertical and
horizontal transmission are equally likely, i.e., τ = 0.5, and to assume that, as in [1], all constants
ci; i = {ZX,XZ,XW,WX,ZY, Y Z} are the same, with ci = c = 2. Thus, taking also into account
that z = 1− x− y − w, equations (3) to (5) become:
x˙ = x
[
sX(1− x− y − w)− (1 − sX)(y + α(1 − x− y − w)) + (2s
′
X − 1)w
]
(6)
y˙ = y [(1− sX)(1 − x− y − w)− sX(x+ β(1 − x− y − w))] (7)
w˙ = xw(1 − 2s
′
X) (8)
The phase space is given by the unit tetrahedron Ω =
{
θ ∈ [0, 1]3 : x+ y + w ≤ 1
}
and the system above
has the following isolated fixed points: (1, 0, 0) and (x¯, y¯, 0), where x¯ = (1−sX)[1−sX (1+β)]
1−sX+s2X−sX(1−sX )(α+β)
and y¯ =
sX [sX−α(1−sX )]
1−sX+s2X−sX (1−sX )(α+β)
, the latter fixed point belongs to Ω if α1+α < sX <
1
1+β . The following sets of fixed
points are also in Ω: (0, 0, w) and (0, y, 1− y). The stability of the isolated fixed points can be determined
by the analysis of the eigenvalues of the linearized system, while I use a qualitative analysis of the evolution
of the trajectories to study stability of the two sets of fixed points. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
evaluated at (1, 0, 0) are λi =
{
−sX + (1− sX)α;−sX ; 1− 2s
′
X
}
, which are all negative provided s
′
X > 0.5
and sX >
α
1+α , i.e., a population of monolinguals of the native language is an asymptotically stable state
provided the status of the native language is above a given threshold and the status of the pro-immigration
(assimilationist) ideology is stronger than the nationalistic one. On the other hand, the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix evaluated at (x¯, y¯, 0) have mixed signs, thus the fixed point (x¯, y¯, 0) is unstable.
Theorem 1: when the status of the native language is within an intermediate level given by sX =
α
1+α < sX <
1
1+β = sX and the status of the pro-immigration ideology is above that of the nationalistic
ideology, s
′
X > 0.5, the population of the country either evolves to a monolingual group of native language
speakers, i.e., immigrants get assimilated and nationalism disappears, or to a bilingualism state composed
of two segregated groups, one of nationalistic individuals, all speaking the native language, and the other of
monolinguals speaking the foreign language. In such a context, in contrast with the widespread literature,
monolingualism can actually be a good state and bilingualism an undesired one.
Proof: when (sX < sX < sX) ∧
(
s
′
X > 0.5
)
, any trajectory starting in the interior of Ω satisfies w˙ < 0.
Moreover, x˙ = 0 at any point located on the plane Px : x = (1 − y − w) −
(1−sX )y−(2s
′
X
−1)w
sX−α(1−sX )
and y˙ = 0 at
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any point located on the plane Py : x = (1− y−w)
(
1− sX1−sXβ
)
. At the boundary of Ω given by w = 0, Px
and Py are lines intercepting each other at the fixed point (x¯, y¯, 0). Px crosses the boundaries of Ω at the
vertex (1, 0, 0) and at
(
0, sX−α(1−sX)1−α(1−sX ) , 0
)
and
(
0,
2s
′
X
−1
2s
′
X
−sX
, 1−sX
2s
′
X
−sX
)
. Any trajectory starting in the interior
of Ω and above (below) Px satisfies x˙ < 0 (x˙ > 0), hence in the invariant manifold (x, 0, 0), x˙ is necessarily
non-negative. On the other hand, Py crosses the boundaries of Ω at the vertices (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1) and at(
1− sX1−sXβ , 0, 0
)
. Any trajectory starting in the interior of Ω and above (below) Py satisfies y˙ < 0 (y˙ > 0),
hence in the invariant manifold (0, y, 0), y˙ is necessarily non-negative. Consequently, any population with
initial conditions located both below Px and above Py satisfies x˙ > 0; y˙ < 0 and w˙ < 0, thus converging
in the long run to the asymptotically stable state (1, 0, 0), becoming a monolingual population of speakers
of the native language, in which nationalism becomes extinct and immigrants become linguistically and
culturally assimilated if one follows [7] and adopts language as a proxy for culture. On the other hand, any
initial condition located both above Px and below Py satisfies x˙ < 0; y˙ > 0 and w˙ < 0, thus converging to a
neutrally stable state in the invariant manifold (0, y, 1−y), i.e., a segregated bilingual society with immigrants
speaking the foreign language and nationalistic individuals speaking the native language, i.e., both groups
Y and W survive. Any other interior initial condition necessarily converges to either (1, 0, 0) ∨ (0, y, 1− y)

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Figure 2: Phase spaces for parameters: sX = 0.575; s
′
X = 0.6; α = 0.2; β = 0.6; initial conditions
(0.05, 0.05, 0.8) (left panel) and (0.1, 0.7, 0.1) (right panel); dotted (dashed) lines represent plane x˙ = 0
(y˙ = 0); step size ∆t = 0.05 (color online).
Figures 2 and 3 present respectively the phase spaces and the time evolutions for two simulations using the
following parameters: sX = 0.575; s
′
X = 0.6; α = 0.2; β = 0.6, i.e., a country in which the pro-immigration
ideology status is one and a half times stronger than the nationalistic ideology, the native language has
a stronger status than the foreign language and bilinguals are moderately seen as representatives of the
native language for the monolinguals in Y but natives in X weekly see bilinguals as representatives of the
immigrants’ language. Initial conditions are (x0, y0, w0) = (0.05, 0.05, 0.8) (left panels) and (x0, y0, w0) =
(0.1, 0.7, 0.1) (right panels). With the former initial conditions, the share of group X is monotonically
increasing while nationalists shift their ideology and over time monolingual immigrants become bilinguals
further becoming fully assimilated, i.e., Y → Z → X . On the other hand, with the latter initial conditions,
one can see the evolution towards a segregated country with two monolingual groups and nationalism. As in
the first simulation, nationalism is monotonically decreasing, but once pro-immigrants in X disappear, the
8
share of nationalists that remains is no more influenced by those to shift their ideology and monolinguals
of the native language remain in an isolated nationalistic enclave, without contact with monolinguals of the
foreign language.
Theorem 2: in the absence of nationalism, bilingualism is not stable and one language eventually takes
over the entire population as in [1] and [4].
Proof: when w = 0, the phase space becomes the unit triangle Ω =
{
θ ∈ [0, 1]2 : x+ y ≤ 1
}
. The eigen-
values of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at point (0, 0), i.e., z = 1, are λi = {sX − α(1− sX); 1 − sX − sXβ}
which are both negative if α > sX1−sX ∧ β >
1−sX
sX
. Such a condition can never be satisfied given α, β ∈ [0, 1]
by definition. Thus, when bilinguals do affect the transition probabilities as in [5], bilingualism stability
depends on the way the conversion rate constants kZX , kXZ , kZY , kY Z are defined in equations (1) and (2).
If language status is to be explicitly defined in the system equations, bilingualism is unstable 
Figure 3: Time evolution for parameters: sX = 0.575; s
′
X = 0.6; α = 0.2; β = 0.6; initial conditions
(0.05, 0.05, 0.8) (left panel) and (0.1, 0.7, 0.1) (right panel); step size ∆t = 0.05; red: pro-immigration
natives; green: nationalists; blue: foreign language monolinguals (color online).
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